When the Proverb Lands Wrong: Figurative Language in Autism and Dyslexia
- In a tightly matched Greek sample (N=105; 35 ASD, 35 dyslexia, 35 typically developing; mean age 10.5, SD 1; matched on age, gender, nonverbal reasoning), both clinical groups scored significantly lower than TD peers on figurative language comprehension — and statistically indistinguishable from each other.
- Proverbs were harder than idioms across all three groups, with the gap markedly steeper in the neurodevelopmental groups — pointing to a shared bottleneck in extracting analogical structure from culturally encoded text.
- Reading comprehension was reduced in both ASD and dyslexia groups; structural language deficits (vocabulary, morphosyntax) were present in both, but the ASD group showed a more heterogeneous, milder profile than dyslexia.
- Predictors diverged: in TD children figurative competence tracked age and reading comprehension; in ASD and dyslexia, structural language carried more of the variance — meaning the door into nonliteral meaning runs through different rooms depending on the diagnosis.
If you sit with autistic or dyslexic children for any length of time, you already know that "she has her head in the clouds" can land as a literal weather report. What this study does is force two clinical groups that we usually treat as cognitively distinct — autism and dyslexia — into the same matched design and ask: do they fail figurative language for the same reasons, or different ones? The answer is interesting. Surface performance is similar. The mechanisms are not.
What the data shows
Pelekanou and Andreou (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki and University of Thessaly) recruited 105 upper-elementary children, 35 per group, matched on chronological age (M = 10.5, SD = 1), gender, and nonverbal reasoning. Figurative competence was assessed across idioms and proverbs. Both clinical groups underperformed TD controls on every measure — and crucially, ASD and dyslexia did not differ from each other.
Proverbs were the universal stumbling block. For all three groups, idioms (more conventional, more frequently exposed in oral culture) were easier than proverbs (which demand stripping a concrete narrative down to an abstract claim). The gap between proverbs and idioms widened sharply in the clinical groups — proverbs require precisely the analogical second-step that both diagnoses tax in different ways.
Regression untangled the mechanisms. In TD kids, figurative competence rose with age and with reading comprehension — the expected developmental trajectory. In ASD and dyslexia, structural language (receptive vocabulary, morphosyntax) was the dominant predictor. Same surface deficit, different routes in. The ASD group was also more heterogeneous than the dyslexia group, with comparatively milder language impairments — which fits the increasingly accepted picture of ASD as a disorder of profile, not severity.
For your practice
For SLPs and child therapists, this is a directive piece of data. If a child with ASD or dyslexia is missing a metaphor in session, the intervention target is not "explain figurative language" — it is the upstream structural language layer. Vocabulary depth and morphosyntactic processing are doing the work. Proverbs in particular should be flagged as the harder edge case: do not assume that a child who handles "raining cats and dogs" can handle "still waters run deep."
For psychotherapists working with adolescents on the autism spectrum, the implication runs into clinical metaphor itself. Therapeutic metaphors — the "container," the "weight you're carrying," the "wall" — are proverbs in disguise. They demand the same analogical lift that proverbs require. Before deploying a metaphor as an intervention, the question is no longer "is this a good metaphor" but "does this client's structural language let the metaphor land." The same metaphor that opens a door for a typically developing teenager may close one for an autistic teenager who hears it literally and doubts your competence.
The clinical move I take from this: when working with neurodivergent clients, lead with the concrete and let the figurative arrive later — earned, not imposed. Check comprehension with a paraphrase task. If the client cannot restate the metaphor in their own concrete terms, the metaphor has not yet landed.
Surface failure on figurative language looks the same in autism and dyslexia, but the mechanism differs — and so should the intervention target.
Cross-sectional design with small per-group cells (n=35) limits generalizability and statistical power for subtype analysis; Greek-language stimuli mean cross-linguistic replication is needed before extending to clinical populations in other languages.